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Property remains a contentious issue in the new South Africa due to the unequal distribution 
of wealth. At the heart of this emotive issue is the question of land reform - owing to the 
history of racially based land dispossession. Politicians have been discussing using 
expropriation as a method to transform land ownership and redress past injustices.  
 
The Expropriation Bill has been introduced in this context with the aim to assist the state in 
its land reform policies. The Bill contains a definition of property (which is capable of 
expropriation) that simply directs the reader to Section 25 of the Constitution, which itself 
has no express or limited definition of property.  
 
The logical question which faces scholars, politicians, foreign investors and the man-on-the-
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The expropriation of land and movable property, in the interest of advancing the agenda and 
goals of the state, is not a unique concept to South Africa. It is possible to find laws granting 
the ability to expropriate property to the state throughout the entire world. However, when a 
Bill is drafted so that property means ‘[p]roperty as contemplated in section 25 of the 
Constitution’1 and the Constitution only expressly contemplates property to mean that it is 
“not limited to land”,2 it poses a problem with regard to the certainty of what exactly can be 
expropriated by the state under the proposed legislation.  
 
1.2 Synopsys of the context of expropriation in South Africa 
 
In the South African context, the expropriation process for movable and immovable property 
is presently provided for by the Expropriation Act passed in 1975.3 This Act vested the state 
with the lawful capacity to compel a citizen to part with their property and so acquire 
property needed to advance the objectives of the state. This Act applies to movable and 
immovable property4 and provides that compensation for expropriation should be the amount 
“which the property would have realized if sold on the date of notice in the open market by a 
willing-seller to a willing-buyer”.5 
 
At the dawn of democracy the Interim Constitution6 and now our present Constitution7 made 
provision for the protection of property rights, but also for the state to expropriate property 
for a public purpose or in the public interest.  While this dissertation does not seek to explore 
                                                          
1 Section 1 Expropriation Bill B4D-2015, ISBN 978-1-4850-0314-4. Henceforth referred to as the 
“Expropriation Bill 2015”. 
2 Section 25(4)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Henceforth referred to as the 
“Constitution”. 
3 Act 63 of 1975. Henceforth referred to as the “Expropriation Act”. 
4 See the definition of property in section 1 of the Expropriation Act. 
5 Section 12(a)(i) of the Expropriation Act. 
6 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. Henceforth referred to as the “Interim 
Constitution”. 
7 The right to property was protected in section 28 of the Interim Constitution and is protected in section 25 of 
the Constitution. 
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the details of the historical development of the constitutional property clause,8 it will touch on 
the interpretation of this clause as it currently stands to examine the scope of property for the 
purpose of the Expropriation Bill 2015.9  
 
The introduction of constitutionalism in South Africa requires that all legislation and 
common law be developed to ensure that it promotes the spirit, purport and objects of the 
Constitution and further promotes a society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.10 
The Constitution, therefore, is transformative in nature, as opposed to being 
conservative/preservative in nature,11 and this should be borne in mind when considering its 
application to the field of property law in South Africa. 
 
It is on the above basis that existing laws are being reviewed both by responsible departments 
who use existing legislation in their functions and by the courts when a challenge to the 
constitutional validity of provisions of legislation is raised.  
 
It is in this context that the Expropriation Bill 2015 was introduced and it is in this context 
that this dissertation seeks to critically assess the scope and ambit of the definition of 
property in clause 1 of the Expropriation Bill 2015. 
 
1.3 Main objectives of this dissertation 
 
As indicated above, the purpose of this dissertation is to critically assess the scope and ambit 
of the definition of property in clause 1 of the Expropriation Bill 2015 in light of the fact that 
the Bill does not provide a substantive definition. Instead, it simply refers the reader to 
section 25 of the Constitution, which simply provides that “property is not limited to land”.  
 
                                                          
8 This a broad reference to the whole of section 25 of the Constitution which is frequently used in various 
academic literature.  
9 Although the Expropriation Bill 2015 has been passed by both the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces, the President has referred the Bill back to Parliament for reconsideration in terms of 
section 79(1) of the Constitution. In his referral the President indicated that he has reservations about extent to 
which the National Council of Provinces and the Provincial Legislatures have facilitated public participation in 
the legislative process (see the letter referring the Expropriation Bill (B4D – 2015) to the National Assembly 
dated 14 February 2017, available at: 
http://legalbrief.co.za/media/filestore/2017/02/zuma_on_expropriation_bill.pdf, accessed on 17 February 2017). 
10 Section 39 of the Constitution. 
11 FI Michelman “Expropriation, Eviction, and the Dignity of the Common Law” (2013) 24(2) Stellenbosch Law 
Review 245. 
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As this dissertation will illustrate, the constitutional concept of property is a particularly wide 
one and stretches far beyond the narrow common law concept of property of real rights in 
things to include, inter alia, creditors’ rights in performances, intellectual property rights in 
intellectual property, intangible commercial interests such as a grocer’s wine licence and 
even “new property” such as a government housing allowance.12 
  
Given that the constitutional concept of property is not limited to land or movables, the 
decision to base the definition of property in the Expropriation Bill 2015 on the conceptual 
concept of property may prove to be a potential slippery slope for the security of property 
rights in South Africa.  
 
The principle concern of this dissertation, therefore, will be to explore what is presently 
considered to be property and therefore what is presently capable of being expropriated 
should the definition of property in the Expropriation Bill 2015 not be revised 
 
 1.4 Research question and sub-questions 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to critically analyse the definition of property in clause 1 of 
the Expropriation Bill 2015. More particularly, the purpose of this dissertation is to critically 
discuss the following research questions: 
 
(a)  How is property defined in terms of common law and in the Constitution? 
 
(b)  How has the Constitution, if at all, altered the definition of property from what it was 
previously understood to be in terms of the common law? 
 
(c)  In light of the meaning of property in terms of the constitutional jurisprudence and 
private law meaning, what does property in clause 1 of the Expropriation Bill 2015 
mean? 
 
(d) How does the definition of property in the Expropriation Bill 2015 therefore compare 
with the definition of property in terms of section 1 of the Expropriation Act of 1975? 
                                                          
12 See chapters two and three of this dissertation. 
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(e) What is the impact of the new definition of property (as proposed in the Expropriation 
Bill 2015) on the security of property rights in South Africa? 
 





This dissertation is the product of a desktop enquiry, which draws all its sources from the 
public domain. Sources for this research, therefore, will include, but are not limited to, 
published textbooks, academic journal articles, Government Gazettes, national and provincial 
legislation, regulations determined in terms of any legislation from time to time, websites of 
institutes which publish researched content related to the topic and other articles published in 
the public domain.   
 
1.6 Structure of dissertation 
 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. 
  
Chapter One of this dissertation gives a basic introduction to the topic area and raises the 
need to discuss the definition of property as defined in the Expropriation Bill 2015. 
 
Chapter Two introduces the reader to the types of property which exist in terms of private 
law. More specifically it discusses the development of the concept of a thing, how things may 
be classified, what real rights and limited real rights are, before considering types of property 
created by statute. This chapter essentially reminds the reader of what has been settled to be 
property in terms of the common law and statutes.  This basis will inform and enrich the 
discussion of property throughout the dissertation.             
 
Chapter Three examines the definition of property according to section 25 of the Constitution 
and discusses constitutional jurisprudence which has considered the question of what should 
constitute property in terms of this section. It will examine the historical development of the 
11 
property clause before examining the constitutional concept of property. What is of special 
interest to the reader will be to consider the most recent jurisprudence which has expanded 
the meaning of property beyond the types identified in Chapter Two so as to include 
commercial interests. 
 
Chapter Four proceeds to introduce the existing Expropriation Act of 1975 and the historical 
development of the Expropriation Bill 2015. It is specifically noted that, given the focus of 
Chapters Two and Three, only the definitions of property in the Act, draft bills and the 
Expropriation Bill 2015 are considered.  This chapter will explore the historical development 
of the post-apartheid Expropriation Bill, from its inception and first tabling in 2008, to its 
redraft in 2013, and finally to its present form which this dissertation will analyse. Attention 
is paid to how the meaning of property, as discussed in Chapter Three, will be of particular 
importance to understanding the meaning of property in clause 1 of  the Expropriation Bill 
2015 before discussing its implications and alternative definitions for property which have 
been proposed by interested parties.  
 
Chapter Five critically analyses the implications of the ideas contained in the second to fourth 
chapters, as noted above, and further the impact of attempting to import the definition of 
property from the Constitution into the Expropriation Bill 2015. Future difficulties are 
considered, especially in light of the developing constitutional jurisprudence on this topic, 
before proposing an alternative definition and the reasons therefor.   
  
1.7 Limitations of the dissertation 
  
From the outset, any dissertation analysing the Expropriation Bill 2015 needs to draw very 
clear and deliberate lines regarding what will be discussed and what will not. The purpose is 
to ensure that a topic is adequately dealt with in one paper, without considering other issues 
that may detract from a comprehensive discussion of the topic at hand.  
 
For the purpose of clarity, this dissertation aims only to explore the meaning of property as 
developed in the common law and constitutional jurisprudence and how it resultantly affects 
what will be deemed to be property for the purposes of the Expropriation Bill 2015. 
  
12 
This dissertation, therefore, will not discuss: 
(a)  what constitutes a public purpose, or what may be considered to be in the public 
interest; 
(b) issues concerning access to the courts; 
(c) comparisons of the scope of expropriation legislation in other jurisdictions unless 
expressly referred to in cited cases; and 
(d) the multitude of challenges facing land reform, other than where expropriation has 
been argued to be an alternative. 
 
Where the above have been mentioned, it is for the sake of completeness but not with the 




























Prior to the new constitutional dispensation in South Africa, the rights in and to property were 
recognised in the common law and various statutes. This chapter seeks to explore the legal 
foundation for the types of property which exist in the private law in South Africa. The 
Roman, Roman-Dutch and English law influences shall be examined first before considering 
how statutes have also shaped the law when considering the meaning and scope of property. 
 
It will be necessary to revisit with the common law first, since this forms the foundation for 
interpreting the term property, so as to properly assess what constitutes property in the 
Expropriation Bill 2015.  
 
2.2 The common law  
 
The common law is the law which effects and guides the daily life of the average person in 
South Africa.13 The common law has been recognised and recorded through writings of 
jurists and the judgments of the courts over the centuries, which means that South African 
property law has both common law and civil law features.14  
 
Van der Walt notes that the civil law tradition dominates our property law system resulting in 
a narrow definition of what the objects of property are, the rights which can be acquired in 
property and the remedies which exist to protect an owner’s right to property.15 
 
The civil law tradition in our common law has a particularly narrow concept of property since 
it recognises only one category of objects and its corresponding category of right to be 
property, namely things and real rights.16 Other categories of objects such as performances 
and intellectual property and their corresponding categories of rights, namely creditors’ rights 
and intellectual property rights are not seen as property in the narrow sense as they crucially 
                                                          
13 FI Michelman (See note 11) at 246-247. 
14 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert Silberberg and Schoeman’s The Law of Property 5ed (2006) at 6. 
15 AJ van der Walt Property and Constitution (2012) at 116. 
16 W Erlank “Classifying Objects in Space According to South African Property Law” (2016) 37(1) Obiter 87 at 
90.  
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do not meet the corporeality requirement.17  
 
Although performances and intellectual property and their corresponding categories of rights, 
namely creditors’ rights and intellectual property rights are not regarded as property in the 
narrow sense, most academic commentators accept that they should be regarded as property 
in a broader sense. This is because like things, performances and intellectual property are 
classified as patrimonial objects and, similarly, like real rights, creditors’ rights and 
intellectual property rights are classified as patrimonial rights.18 
 
2.3 Sources of property law  
 
The Roman-Dutch law influences our property law in numerous ways, but specifically plays 
a large role in determining the law as it applies to the ownership and use of things or 
corporeal objects.19 This dissertation does not aim to conduct an in-depth historical study of 
the Roman and Roman-Dutch rules or jurists’ opinions but rather to introduce the framework 
of the private law of property. 
 
It is noteworthy that English law influences can also be found in our law of property with 
concepts such as attornment20 being incorporated and the concept of the 99-year leasehold 
being introduced to cater for situations where long-term use was desired, but the owner did 









                                                          
17 AJ van der Walt and R Shay “Constitutional Analysis of Intellectual Property” (2014) 17(1) Potchefstroom 
Electronic Law Journal 52-85 at 67.  
18 CG van der Merwe “Things” LAWSA Vol 27 2ed (2014) at paragraph 5. 
19 Ibid at paragraph 6.  
20 A method of delivery of property to effect transfer of ownership. 
21 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 7. 
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2.4 The concept of a thing 
 
According to Van der Walt and Pienaar, a thing may be defined as a “corporeal or tangible 
object external to persons and which is, as an independent entity, subject to the juridical 
control by a legal subject, to whom it is useful and of value.”22 In order to be classified as a 
thing, therefore, an object has to satisfy the following five characteristics: 
 
(a) corporeality; 
(b) external to persons; 
(c) independent entity; 
(d) subject to juridical control; and 
(e) useful and of value.23 
 




A thing can be deemed to be corporeal, according to Voet, if it can be felt and touched by a 
person who is inspecting it whereas other jurists such as Grotius provided that a thing may be 
corporeal if it is perceivable by the external senses.24  
 
(b) External to humans/Impersonal in nature 
 
A thing must be external to the human body and therefore the human body or its parts cannot 
be regarded as things.25 A person is generally regarded as a legal subject and not a legal 
object/thing, although a corpse or body parts that become external to the body could 




                                                          
22 AJ van der Walt and GJ Pienaar Introduction to the Law of Property 7ed (2016) at 15. 
23 AJ van der Walt and GJ Pienaar (See note 22) at 15 to 18. See also PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert 
(See note 14) at 14 to 22. 
24 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 14. 
25 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 19. 




To satisfy this requirement, a thing needs to be a definite and distinct entity.27 For example, a 
fruit prior to its separation from a tree is not independent and hence does not meet this 
requirement in order to be a thing until it is separated from the tree.28  
 
(d) Subject to human control  
 
To be considered a thing, the object needs to be able to be controlled by humans and 
therefore traditionally celestial bodies (like the moon or sun) or an inaccessible object which 
cannot be brought under human control (like a shipwreck) cannot be the object of any real 
rights.29  
 
(e) Use and Value 
 
No legal relationship may exist between a thing and a legal subject unless there is a use for 
the thing and it has value.30 Value need not be economic and can also be sentimental in order 
to satisfy this requirement.31  
 
The concept of classifying things as corporeal or incorporeal did not exist in the Roman 
property law system32 hence the notion of corporality as a requirement for a thing, as 
discussed by the Roman-Dutch Jurists, is controversial in nature given that South African 






                                                          
27 W Erlank (See note 16) at 93. 
28 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 21. 
29 Ibid at 21. 
30 W Erlank (See note 16) at 94.  
31 Ibid at 94. 
32 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 15. 
33 Ibid at 15. 
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There are many different methods which can be used to classify things - either by their nature 
or in their relation to a legal subject.34  
 
(b) Classifying things according to their relation to persons 
 
Things, may be either in commerce (res in commercio) or out of commerce (res extra 
commercium).35 Things which are in commerce (res in commercio) are those objects which 
are capable of being privately owned, traded and sold – therefore things which are not 
capable of being categorised as such are things that are “out of commerce” (res extra 
commercium).36  
 
Things that are out of commerce, or not capable of being privately owned, include: common 
things (e.g. the air, the sea or running water),37 public things (things belonging to a civic 
community e.g. roads or administrative buildings),38 things belonging to corporate bodies but 
are not public (e.g. markets or churches)39 and religious things (e.g. temples and graves).40  
 
(c) Things classified according to their nature 
 
When classifying things according to their nature, several traits are used in classification, 
namely determining whether things are: corporeal or incorporeal things, movable or 
immovable things, divisible or indivisible things, consumable or non-consumable things, 
fungible or non-fungible things and single or complex things.41 Each of these classifications 
will be discussed in more detail below. 
                                                          
34 See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 23 to 44 for an in-depth assessment of these 
categories. See also CG van der Merwe (See note 18) at paragraph 5. 
35 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 25. 
36 Ibid at 25. 
37 Ibid at 25. 
38 Ibid at 26.  
39 Ibid at 29.  
40 Ibid at 30-31. 
41 See PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 34- 44 for a discussion of these classifications. 
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(i) Corporeal and incorporeal things 
 
When classifying things according to their nature, a distinction can be drawn between things 
that are physical/tangible (capable of being perceived by the five senses) and things that are 
intangible (usually rights or objects that which is incapable of being perceived by the five 
senses).42 Examples of corporeal things are items like books, a cellphone, computers, 
furniture, pots, houses, clothes, cars and so forth.43 Examples of incorporeal things are “real 
rights, personal rights and immaterial property rights”.44 Van der Merwe notes that the 
classification of things as corporeal and incorporeal still has a practical role in the application 
of the law to situations and therefore remains an important distinction to be applied when 
classifying things according to their nature.45  
 
(ii) Movable and immovable things  
 
Land and the things deemed to be permanently attached to the land (acceded to the land) 
constitute immovable property.46 Movable things are those which are not immovable and 
hence may be moved from place to place without incurring any damage to the thing that may 
hinder its usefulness or value.47 Movables may accede to an immovable if attached in some 
manner which is deemed to be or intended to be permanent - and thereafter they be 
considered as part of the immovable. 48 For example, bricks are movable but when they are 
incorporated into a house in a manner that is intended to be permanent (i.e. laid in a wall with 






                                                          
42 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 33. 
43 CG van der Merwe (See note 18) at paragraph 46.  
44 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 33. 
45 CG van der Merwe (See note 18) at paragraph 46. 
46 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 34. 
47 Ibid at 34. 
48 CG van der Merwe (See note 18) at paragraph 51. 
49 Ibid at 51.  
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(iii) Divisible and indivisible things 
 
A thing is considered to be divisible if it is capable of being split into two or more 
portions/objects without destroying the thing outright or harming its functionality or value to 
the user.50 Examples of divisible things include butter or sand, but a horse would be 
considered to be indivisible because dividing it in half would destroy it outright and impair its 
functionality.51 
 
(iv) Consumable and non-consumable things 
 
A thing which may be used up, or finished, is classified as a consumable and examples would 
include food, beverages, candles or fuels.52 A non-consumable thing may be used by the 
possessor without the thing being diminished or rendered incapable of continuing its function 
and therefore an example of this would be furniture which may be sat on time and time again 
without consuming it or diminishing its function.53 
 
(v) Fungible and non-fungible things 
 
A fungible thing is deemed to be interchangeable with another thing that is considered 
identical to it hence fungibles are things that have not been individually determined but 
generally are handled with reference to a weight, a measure or numbers thereof.54 An 
example of fungibles may be horses, which are given importance collectively because they 
belong to a class of objects in which they are considered identical to each other and not 
because of their individual qualities.55 A horse may also be considered non-fungible if it is 
singled out due to distinguishable qualities like its superior breed, ancestry or even a winning 
track record in races.56 These qualities make that singled out horse incapable of merely being 
replaced by another horse unless it shares the same distinct qualities.57 
 
                                                          
50 CG van der Merwe (See note 18) at paragraph 50. 
51 Ibid at paragraph 50. 
52 Ibid at paragraph 49. 
53 Ibid at paragraph 49.  
54 Ibid at paragraph 48.  
55 Ibid at paragraph 48.  
56 Ibid at paragraph 48.  
57 Ibid at paragraph 48. 
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(vi) Single and complex things 
 
A single thing is an “individual thing which has not been the subject matter of accession”58 
and so it therefore is considered a thing in its own right – such as a wooden beam.59 Once a 
single thing is combined in such a way that it an accessory to another principle or auxiliary 
thing, it will lose its independent identity through combination.60 An example of a 
complex/composite thing is a ship which was wooden beams built into it.61 
 
2.6 The concept of a real right 
 
It is not only things that are considered to be property in the narrow sense, but also real rights. 
According to Badenhorst, Pienaar and Mostert, a real right may be defined as a “legally 
supported claim to a thing”.62 
 
In South African law real rights are divided into two categories, namely: ownership and 
limited real rights. Of these two categories, ownership is described as the most complete real 
right. This means, at least in principle, that is an unrestricted right and that an owner may use 
his or her property as he or she likes. Ownership is also the only real right a person may 
acquire in his or her own property. It is for this reason that ownership is sometimes referred 
to as iura in re propria.63 Unlike ownership, limited real rights are not unrestricted. Instead, 
they are limited to certain specific uses in someone else’s property. It is for this reason that 
they are sometimes referred to as iura in re aliena.64 
 
In Roman law there was a closed list (numerus clausus) of limited real rights, namely 
servitudes (servitutes), pledge (pignus), mortgage (hypotheca), building grants (superficies) 
and perpetual leases (emphyteusis). The same approach, however, was not followed in 
Roman-Dutch law, largely as a result of the introduction of feudal rights. Apart from the 
categories set out above, therefore, several other categories of limited real rights were 
recognised in Roman-Dutch law, for example the right to inherit, perpetual quitrent and 
                                                          
58 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 41.  
59 Ibid at 41. 
60 Ibid at 41. 
61 Ibid at 41. 
62 Ibid at 48. 
63 AJ van der Walt and GJ Pienaar (See note 22) at 25-26.  
64 Ibid at 25-26. 
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possibly possession. Like Roman-Dutch law, modern South African law also does not have a 
closed list of limited real rights.65 
 
2.7 Creditor’s rights and intellectual property rights 
 
As has been seen, most academic commentators also accept that common law definition of 
property in its broader sense goes beyond things and real rights and also includes 
“performances” and “intellectual property” as well as their corresponding categories of rights, 
namely “creditors’ rights” and “intellectual property rights”. This is because, like things and 
real rights, these categories of objects and rights are patrimonial in nature.66  
 
Patrimonial objects are those on which a monetary or pecuniary value can be placed and, 
accordingly, which form a part of a person’s estate or patrimony. Non-patrimonial objects are 
those on which a monetary or pecuniary value cannot be placed and which do not form a part 
of a person’s estate or patrimony. Instead of a monetary or economic value, they have a 
sentimental value. Given that performances and intellectual property are classified as 
patrimonial objects, their corresponding categories of rights may also be classified as 
patrimonial rights.67 
 
A performance may be defined as an “act by someone else, which can take the form of dare 
(to give), facere (to do) and non facere (not to do)”,68 while a creditor’s right may be defined 
as a legally supported claim to a human act in terms of which the holder of the right acquires 
certain powers over the act which has to be performed. The act which has to be performed is 
also referred to as an “obligation”. Creditors’ rights, therefore, are derived from obligations 
and obligations arise either from a contract or a delict. The law of contract and the law of 
delict together are thus known as the law of obligations.69 
 
                                                          
65 CG van der Merwe (See note 18) at paragraph 62.  
66 Ibid at paragraph 5. 
67 L du Plessis An Introduction to Law 3ed (1999) at 145. While things, performances and intellectual property 
are classified as patrimonial objects, aspect of personality are classified as non-patrimonial objects. Aspects of 
personality are defined as a person’s dignity (dignitas), reputation (fama), privacy and physical and mental 
integrity (corpus) (see L du Plessis (See note 67) at 138).  
68 L du Plessis (See note 67) at 138. 
69 Ibid at 143-144. 
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Intellectual property may be defined “as the non-tangible products of the human mind, that is 
to say the ‘products’ of human skill and ingenuity, such as the design of a house, the contents 
of a story, an invention, etc”,70 while intellectual property rights may be defined as legally 
supported claims to a non-tangible product of the human mind in terms of which the holder of 
the right acquires certain powers over the non-tangible product. Examples of intellectual 
property rights include copyright, patents and trademarks.71 
 
2.8 Statutes which create new types of property 
 
While the common law definition of what constitutes property aids in the classification of 
everyday objects as types of property, it simply is not sufficient to keep up with the 
increasingly complex relationships which people wish to have with things, rights in and to 
things and incorporeal property. In order to address this problem, Parliament has intervened 
and passed legislation creating new kinds of things and new kinds of ownership and other 
limited real rights. The most significant of these is sectional title ownership.72 
 
Sectional titles were first introduced in South Africa when the Sectional Titles Act73 was 
enacted. This Act was subsequently replaced by the Sectional Titles Act, which is still in 
force.74 The 1986 Act has been extensively amended by the Sectional Titles Schemes 
Management Act.75 Both the 1971 and the 1986 Sectional Titles Acts were passed in order to 
make it possible for a person to become the exclusive and individual owner of a part of a 
building. This is because prior to the enactment of the 1971 Sectional Titles Act, separate 
ownership of the different parts of a building was not possible.  
 
The reason why separate ownership of the different parts of a building was not possible prior 
to the introduction of the Sectional Titles Act is because the common law provides that 
whoever owns the land owns everything that is permanently attached to it.  
                                                          
70 L du Plessis (See note 67) at 138. 
71 Ibid at 143. 
72 Apart from sectional title ownership, legislation has also made provision for share blocks (Share Blocks 
Control Act 59 of 1980), property time sharing (Property Time-sharing Control Act75 of 1983) and housing 
development schemes for retired persons (Housing Development Schemes for Retired Persons Act 65 of 1988).  
73 66 of 1971. 
74 95 of 1986. 
75 8 of 2011. 
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This point was confirmed in Botes v Toti Development Co (Pty) Ltd76 where the court held 
the following: 
 
Where buildings are permanently annexed to land the owner of the land by means of accessio 
becomes the owner of the building; omne quod inaedificatur solo cedit. Separate ownership 
of horizontal layers not being recognised . . . , it was accordingly not possible to divide a 
building into flats each of which was the object of a separate right of ownership. Mason J in 
Rocher v Registrar of Deeds 1911 TPD 311, was expressing the same principles when he 
stated the following (at p 315): 
 
‘As I understand our law, the owner of the surface of land is the owner of the whole of the 
land and of all minerals in it; he is the owner of what is above and what is below. It is 
unnecessary to determine how far in these days of airships (which at present have not arrived 
in any numbers in South Africa), the dominium extends upwards.’ 
 
Times may have changed but (until 1971) our law of property, in this respect, did not. Of 
necessity, however, much of our Roman-Dutch law is a virile living system . . . and conscious 
as our Courts have been of the desirability that it keep pace with the requirements of changing 
conditions and notions . . . , our system of judicial precedent virtually precludes Judge-made 
modifications to basic legal principles.  
 
In certain instances where such principles have required modification, the Legislature has 
intervened to supply the remedy. The Sectional Titles Act is an example. Prior to its 
enactment alternative methods of achieving individual flat ‘ownership’ had to be resorted to. 
Perhaps the most common was the acquisition of shares in a limited liability company owning 
a block of flats. It is obvious, however, that such shareholders were not the owners of the 
flats. 
 
By creating what has been described as ‘a new composite thing or res; called a unit, as the 
object or subject-matter of a new composite form of ownership’ . . . , the Sectional Titles Act 
has changed the common law position. The result is that several persons can now own 
different parts of the same building.77 
 
                                                          
76 1978 (1) SA 205 (T). 
77 Botes v Toti Development Co (Pty) Ltd 1978 (1) SA 205 (T) at 207. 
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The Sectional Titles Act thus made it possible for a person to become the exclusive and 
individual owner of a part of a building by creating a new thing, namely a unit. This new 
thing consists of two components: first, a section (part of a building such as a flat, office or 
shop) which is individually owned; and second, the common property (the land together with 
all the parts of the building which do not form a part of the sections) which is co-owned.  
 
Apart from ownership of a portion of a building or holders of a share in a company which 
grants rights akin to ownership rights, other statutes exist which give persons limited real 
rights in and to property, such as the Extension of Security of Tenure Act78 which grant 
certain occupiers rights to the use of the property they reside on provided certain conditions 
are met.  
 
2.9 Virtual property 
 
As the introduction of new technologies brings new abilities that allow users to interface with 
and utilise the internet to confer new rights in and to ideas and develop new concepts or 
designs – the world will be increasingly faced with the need to regulate ownership and access 
to this property that exists online. Van der Merwe79 notes that the vested interests people and 
companies presently have in virtual property can range from ownership of domain names, 
websites, contents of websites, databases and even internet profiles.80 This type of property 
will continue to develop and the law will be increasingly faced with the need to resolve 
disputes which may arise in relation to it.  
 
2.10 Summary and conclusion 
 
The definition of property in the private law therefore can be seen to mean either a reference 
to an object/thing or a right in or to a thing irrespective of how the thing may be classified.81 
Statutes have also played a key role in created new things or rights which did not exist prior 
to their promulgation.   
 
 
                                                          
78 Act 62 of 1997.  
79 CG van der Merwe (See note 18) at paragraph 16. 
80 Ibid at paragraph 16. 
81 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 7. 
25 




When the Interim Constitution came into operation on 24 April 1994 the right to private 
property was guaranteed in section 28 which formed a part of the Bill of Rights.  
 
Section 28 was included in the Interim Constitution largely at the insistence of the National 
Party. During the negotiating process the National Party argued that the inclusion of a right to 
property was essential for economic confidence and that individuals should be given the 
assurance that their property would not be confiscated or nationalised by the state in the name 
of economic freedom.82 
 
In response the African National Congress – which was sceptical about a property clause – 
argued that a constitutional right to private property could be used to maintain the existing 
racially skewed distribution of property and that this would frustrate the adoption and 
execution of a programme of land reform. The African National Congress thus demanded that 
a right to claim restitution should also be included in the Interim Constitution.83 
 
These demands were accepted and the Interim Constitution not only included a right to 
restitution in the affirmative action provisions of the equality clause,84 but also set out a 
framework for the establishment of a land claims process.85 This framework conferred a right 
of restitution on any person or community who had been dispossessed of their land rights as a 
result of a racially discriminatory law.86  
 
While the Interim Constitution only contained a right to claim restitution, the Constitution 
goes much further and also includes a right to claim equitable access to land87 and a right to 
                                                          
82 See H Klug Constituting Democracy: Law, Globalisation and South Africa’s Political Reconstruction (2000) 
at 124. 
83 Ibid at 124. See also H. Mostert (2002) The Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property and its 
Influence on the Reform of Private Law and Landownership in South Africa and Germany Berlin: Springer at 
62-64. 
84 S 8(3)(b). 
85 S 121 to 123. 
86 S 121(2). 
87 S 25(5). 
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claim tenure that is secure.88 In addition, these rights have also been grouped together with 
the rights protecting private property and included in the property clause itself.89  
 
The constitutional right to property may thus be divided into two parts: first, subsections (1) 
to (3) which provide for the constitutional protection of private property; and, second, 
subsections (4) to (9) which provide for an extensive programme of land reform. 
 
Subsections (1) to (3) thus provide that: 
 
(1)  No one may be deprived of property except in terms of law of general application, 
and no law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. 
(2)  Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general application: 
(a)  for a public purpose or in the public interest; and 
(b)  subject to compensation, the amount of which and the time and manner of 
payment of which have either been agreed to by those affected or decided or 
approved by a court. 
(3)  The amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just 
and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the 
interests of those affected, having regard to all relevant circumstances, including: 
(a)  the current use of the property; 
(b)  the history of the acquisition and use of the property; 
(c)  the market value of the property; 
(d)  the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and 
beneficial capital improvement of the property; and 
(e) the purpose of the expropriation. 
 
And subsections (4) to (9) provide that: 
 
(4)  For the purposes of this section: 
(a)  the public interest includes the nation’s commitment to land reform, and to 
reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa’s natural 
resources; and 
(b)  property is not limited to land. 
 
                                                          
88 S 25(6). 
89 S 25. 
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(5)  The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain access to land on an 
equitable basis. 
(6)  A person or community whose tenure of land is legally insecure as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act 
of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to comparable redress. 
(7)  A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a result of past 
racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided by an Act 
of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress. 
(8)  No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and other 
measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of 
past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this 
section is in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1). 
(9)  Parliament must enact the legislation referred to in subsection (6). 
 
3.2 The purpose of section 25 
 
When it comes to interpreting section 25 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court has 
stated that the property clause has a dual nature in that it both protects private property rights 
and serves the public interest by providing mechanisms for land reform.90 In First National 
Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Minister of Finance 91(hereafter referred to as 
the FNB case) for example, the Court held that subsections (4) to (9) must be kept in mind 
whenever section 25 is being interpreted, because they emphasise the fact that the protection 
of private property is not absolute but is subject to the interests of the general public. 
 
The purpose of section 25 has to be seen both as protecting existing private property rights as 
well as serving the public interest, mainly in the sphere of land reform but not limited thereto, 
and also as striking a proportionate balance between these two functions . . . When 
considering the purpose and content of the property clause it is necessary, as Van der Walt 
puts it: 
 
                                                          
90 First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) at paragraph 50. 
91 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
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To move away from a static, typically private-law conceptualist view of the constitution as a 
guarantee of the status quo ante to a dynamic, typically public-law view of the constitution as 
an instrument for social change and transformation under the auspices [and I would add ‘and 
control] of entrenched constitutional values’ 
 
That property should also serve the public good is an idea by no means foreign to pre-
constitutional property concepts.92 
 
Somewhat similarly, in Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy93 the 
Constitutional Court held that: 
 
The approach to be adopted… is to have regard to the special role that this section has to play 
in facilitating the fulfilment of our country’s nation-building and reconciliation 
responsibilities, by recognising the need to open up economic opportunities to all South 
Africans. This section thus sits at the heart of an inevitable tension between the interests of 
the wealthy and the previously disadvantaged …in the process of undertaking the difficult 
task of seeking to achieve the equitable distribution of land and wealth to all.94  
 
In the same case, the Court also stated that:  
 
The obligation imposed by section 25 not to over-emphasise private property rights at the 
expense of the state’s social responsibilities. It must always be remembered that our history 
does not permit a near-absolute status to be given to individual property rights to the 
detriment of the equally important duty of the state to ensure that all South Africans partake 
of the benefits flowing from our mineral and petroleum resources. 95   
 
The property clause therefore serves a dual function which necessarily affects its 
interpretation and application to cases brought before the courts.  
 
                                                          
92 First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) at paragraphs 50 to 52. 
93 Agri South Africa v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
94 Ibid at paragraph 60. 
95 Ibid at paragraph 62. See also Haffejee NO and others v eThekwini Municipality and others 2011 (6) SA 
134(CC) at paragraph 31 where the Constitutional Court held that the “purpose of section 25 is to protect 
existing private property rights and to serve the public interest, mainly in the sphere of land reform but not 
limited thereto. Its purpose is also to strike ‘a proportionate balance between these two functions’. ” 
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3.3 The section 25 analysis 
 
Although section 25 has been discussed by the Constitutional Court on a number of occasions 
over the past twenty years, its judgment in the FNB case96 remains one its most significant. 
This is because the Constitutional Court adopted a framework in terms of which section 25 
should be analysed in this case. This analytical framework is made up of a series of questions. 
These questions have been summarised as follows: 
 
(a)  Does that which is taken away by the operation of the legislation amount to property 
for the purpose of section 25? 
(b) Has there been a deprivation of such property by the relevant authority? 
(c) If so, is such deprivation consistent with the provisions of section 25(1)? 
(d) If not, is such deprivation justified under section 36 of the Constitution? 
(e) If so, does it amount to expropriation for the purpose of section 25(2)? 
(f) If so, does the deprivation comply with the requirements of section 25(2)(a) and (b) 
(g) If not, is the expropriation justified under section 36?97  
 
As Rajak has pointed out, when it comes to determining whether a statutory provision has 
violated section 25 of the Constitution, the analysis set out above means that a decision-
maker must start by asking whether the object, right or interest that has been affected 
amounts to property for the purposes of section 25 (question (a)). If the answer to this 
question is yes, she goes on to point out, the decision-maker must ask whether the affected 
party has been deprived of his or her property by the statutory provision in question (question 
(b)). If the answer to this question is also yes, then the decision-maker must ask whether the 
deprivation complies with the requirements set out in section 25(1)(a) and (b) (question (c)).98 
 
If the answer to question (c) is yes, Rajak points out further, then the decision maker must 
jump to question (e), but if the answer is no, then the decision-maker must go onto question 
                                                          
96 First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
97 Ibid at paragraph 46. The common law may also count as “a law of general application” (see S v Thebus 2003 
(6) SA 505 CC at paragraph 65. While this case related to the late disclosure of an alibi by an accused person, it 
considered that the existing common law rule, which allowed the courts to change how it gives weight to such 
evidence due to its late disclosure, was well recognised in the common law and hence could be considered a law 
of general application. See also CG van der Merwe (See note 18) at paragraph 14. 
98 JN Rajak Greening Durban: The Constitutional Validity of the Durban Metropolitan Open Space System in 
Light of Section 25 of the Constitution Unpublished LLM Dissertation, University of KwaZulu-Natal (2015) at 
26 (see also K Davis A critical analysis of section 25 of the NEM: Integrated Coastal Management Act in light 
of section 25 of the Constitution Unpublished LLM Dissertation, University of KwaZulu-Natal (2016) at 39). 
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(d) and ask if the deprivation can be justified in terms of the general limitation clause in 
section 36.99 If the answer is no, the section 25 analysis comes to an end and the deprivation 
must be declared unconstitutional and invalid. However, if the deprivation does comply with 
section 25(1)(a) and (b) or if the deprivation can be justified in terms of the general limitation 
clause, then the decision-maker must ask whether it is an expropriation for the purposes of 
section 25(2) (question (e)).100 
 
If the answer to question (e) is yes, Rajak concludes, then the decision-maker must ask 
whether the expropriation complies with the requirements of section 25(2)(a) and (b) 
(question (f)). If the answer is yes, then the expropriation must be declared to be 
constitutionally valid by the court. If the answer is no, then the court must ask if the 
expropriation can be justified in terms of the general limitation clause (question (g)). If the 
answer to this question is no, then the expropriation must be declared unconstitutional and 
invalid.101 
 
For the purposes of this dissertation the most significant question is the very first one, namely 
“[d]oes that which is taken away by the operation of the legislation amount to ‘property’ for 
the purpose of section 25?”. This is because it performs a gatekeeping function. If the answer 
to this question is no, section 25 does not apply and it is unnecessary to continue with the rest 
of the analysis. 
 
 3.4 The constitutional concept of property 
 
Section 25(4) of the Constitution stipulates that “property is not limited to land”. Apart from 
this section, however, the Constitution does not define the concept of property. In order to 
determine what is meant by the constitutional concept of property, therefore, it is necessary to 
examine the manner in which the concept had been interpreted by the courts and especially 
by the Constitutional Court. 
 
Before turning to consider the jurisprudence, however, it is interesting to note that Du Bois 
                                                          
99 Rights may only be limited if they comply with the obligations set out in section 36 of the Constitution, which 
provides that the limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom. 
100 JN Rajak (See note 98) at 26 (see also K Davis (See note 98) at 39). 
101 Ibid at 39. 
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posits that the lack of specifically mentioned categories of property in the Constitution should 
lead us to conclude that all forms of property should be protected by the provisions of section 
25 unless they are specifically excluded.102 Based on this assertion, the constitutional concept 
of property would include all forms of recognised property as outlined in the common law 
which were discussed in chapter two of this dissertation.  
 
In support of her approach, Du Bois also argues that because the constitutional concept of 
property performs a gatekeeping function, if it is interpreted too narrowly it could deny 
parties the protection that section 25 is intended to provide them and, at the same time, 
relieve the state of its obligations to comply with the requirements of section 25 when it 
interferes with objects, rights and interests. The constitutional concept of property, therefore, 
should be interpreted broadly to ensure the maximum amount of protection for property 
holders.103  
 
Although the Constitutional Court was initially reluctant to define the constitutional concept 
of property,104 over the past twenty years it has largely followed Du Bois’ suggestion and 
adopted an extremely broad definition of constitutional property. In this respect the Court had 
held that the constitutional concept of property does not only include corporeal movables and 
immovable objects, but also rights such as ownership,105 limited real rights,106 creditors’ 
rights,107 and intellectual property rights,108 Apart from these objects and rights, the Court has 
                                                          
102 M du Bois “Intellectual Property as a Constitutional Property Right: The South African Approach” (2012) 24 
SA Merc LJ 177 – 193 at 179. 
103 Ibid at 187. 
104 In First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Minister of Finance2002 (4) SA 768 (CC), the Court stated that it 
is “practically impossible to furnish - and judicially unwise to attempt - a comprehensive definition of property” 
(at paragraph 51). Despite this conclusion, the Court nevertheless found that the ownership of a corporeal 
movable falls into the constitutional concept of property. The constitutional concept thus protects rights and the 
objects of those rights. 
105 Ibid at paragraph 51.  
106 See Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) at paragraph 50. In this case the 
Constitutional Court held that a mineral right falls into the constitutional concept of property. 
107 See National Credit Regulator v Opperman 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) at paragraph 63. In this case the 
Constitutional Court held that a personal right to claim restitution on the grounds of unjustified enrichment falls 
into the constitutional concept of property. See also Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport 2011 
(1) SA 400 (CC) and Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd v Grundlingh 2006 (8) BCLR (CC). 
108 See Laugh it Off Promotions CC v SAB International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (2005) SA 144 
(CC) at paragraph 17. In this case the Constitutional Court held that a trade mark falls into the constitutional 
concept of property. 
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also held that it includes statutory rights and interests such as commercial licences.109 Each of 
these will be discussed in turn below.  
 
3.5 Corporeal objects 
 
Given that the narrow common law definition of property includes corporeal objects, it is not 
surprising that the Constitutional Court has held that the constitutional concept of property 
also includes corporeal objects.  
 
In the FNB110 the Court authoritatively held that land and corporeal movables constitute 
constitutional property.111 The Court held in this respect that: 
 
“Here it is sufficient to hold that ownership of a corporeal movable must - as must ownership 
of land - lie at the heart of our constitutional concept of property, both as regards the nature of 
the right involved as well as the object of the right and must therefore, in principle, enjoy the 
protection of s25”.112 
 
In this case the provisions of the Customs and Excise Act113 which allowed South African 
Revenue Services (SARS) to seize property in the possession of a customs debtor in order to 
settle his or her customs debt, even if that property belonged to a third party, were found to be 
unconstitutional because they resulted in an arbitrary deprivation of property. 
 
The fact that corporeal objects fall into the constitutional concept of property has also been 
confirmed by the High Court. In Zondi v MEC for Traditional & Local Government 
Affairs,114 for example, the KwaZulu–Natal High Court held that livestock constitutes 
constitutional property.  
 
                                                          
109 See Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and Tourism, 
Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraph 5. In this case the Constitutional Court held that a liquor 
licence falls into the constitutional concept of property.  
110 First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
111 Ibid at paragraph 51. 
112 Ibid at paragraph 51. 
113 91 of 1964. 
114 2004 1 All SA 467 (N). 
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In this case the provisions of the Pound Ordinance (KwaZulu-Natal)115 were found to be 
unconstitutional because they resulted in the arbitrary deprivation of property.116 On appeal to 
the Constitutional Court, the provisions of the Ordinance were confirmed to be 
unconstitutional after an analysis of how the ordinance was racially discriminatory and 
restricted the rights of citizens to access the courts.117 
 
3.6 Ownership and limited real rights  
 
Apart from corporeal objects, in the FNB118 the Constitutional Court also found that 
ownership falls into the constitutional concept of property. The fact that First National Bank 
retained ownership of the vehicles in question simply to secure the money it had lent to the 
possessors, the Court held, was irrelevant.119 
 
Insofar as limited real rights are concerned, Pienaar notes that “limited real rights to 
immovable property in particular, either statutory or in terms of common law, constitute 
Constitutional property in the form of incorporeal immovable property”.120 Hence, limited 
real rights such as those that subtract from the bare dominium like a servitude (that burdens 
the property and restricts its usage – like a usufruct or habitatio) or a mortgage bond (that 
restricts transfer of the property unless the outstanding debt is settled) are incorporeal 
immovable things that are property within the scope of section 25.121 
 
In Ex parte Optimal Property Solutions CC122 it was held that restrictive conditions may be 
classified as praedial servitudes and, therefore, are real rights. Given that they are real rights, 
the court held further, they fall into the constitutional concept of property.123 Any deletion of 
these conditions constitutes a deprivation of property and must comply with the requirements 
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of section 25(1).124 In light of this decision it may be argued that all limited real rights, 
including both praedial and personal servitudes, real security rights, long-term leases and 
mineral rights would be recognised as property under section 25. 
 
This argument was confirmed by the Constitutional Court in its judgment in Agri SA v 
Minister for Minerals and Energy125 where it held that mineral rights fall into the 
constitutional concept of property. In this case the Court found that Mineral and Petroleum 
Development Act126 had deprived, but not expropriated, landowners of their right to sterilise 
minerals by not exploiting them.127 
 
3.7 Creditors’ rights  
 
A right which is protected as property must generally have patrimonial value and be vested in 
or accrued to the holder of the right.128 Examples of rights to performance inter partes or 
rights that carry patrimonial benefits for the holder have also been recognised as property for 
the purpose of section 25 of the Constitution.  
 
In the case of the Law Society of South Africa and others v Minister for Transport and 
Another129 the Constitutional Court considered whether a personal right, based in the law of 
obligations, concerning a claim for loss of earning capacity constituted property for the 
purposes of section 25 of the Constitution.130 The Court concluded, without in-depth analysis 
into the question, that these rights constitute property.131  
 
Two years later, in the case of National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others,132 the 
Constitutional Court held that an enrichment claim is property for the purpose of section 25 
of the Constitution. In amplification of this, the Court stated that “[i]n the circumstances of 
this case, the recognition of the right to restitution of money paid, based on unjustified 
                                                          
124 Ex parte Optimal Solutions CC 2003 (2) SA 136 (C) at paragraph 19. See also G Pienaar (See note 120) at 
1487. 
125 2014 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
126 21 of 2002. 
127 Agri SA v Minister for Minerals and Energy 2013 (4) SA 1 (CC) at paragraph 44. 
128 PJ Badenhorst, JM Pienaar and H Mostert (See note 14) at 11. 
129 Law Society of South Africa and Others v Minister for Transport and Another 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC). 
130 Ibid at paragraph 10 and paragraphs 81 to 85. 
131 Ibid at paragraphs 83 to 84. 
132 National Credit Regulator v Opperman and others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC). 
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enrichment, as property under section 25(1) is logical and realistic”.133  
 
After considering much of the same material as already noted above, the Gauteng High Court 
held in the case of African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 134 that: 
 
“Although not real rights enforceable against all, a claim for payment and the right to exercise 
a vote at a statutory meeting convened for the purpose of voting on a business rescue plan, in 
terms of s 153(1)(b)(ii) of the Act, constitute ‘property’ within the meaning of s 25(1) of the 
Constitution”.135  
 
It is accepted, therefore, that a claim sounding in money may be property for the purposes of 
section 25(1) of the Constitution.136  
 
3.8 Intellectual property rights 
 
When intellectual property was considered in the First Certification Judgment137 the 
Constitutional Court found that it was unnecessary to add a separate clause protecting 
intellectual property to the Constitution.138 It held further that an objection to the exclusion of 
an express intellectual property right in the Constitution cannot be sustained as it was not an 
international norm to include such a right.139  
 
Du Bois argues in this respect that the term property in section 25 of the Constitution is “wide 
enough when used in the generic property clause to include rights and interests that require 
protection according to international human rights standards”.140 Therefore, there was no 
need to incorporate a specific provision that would protect intellectual property rights141 or 
identify other forms of property for express mention. 
                                                          
133 National Credit Regulator v Opperman and others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC) at paragraph 63. 
134African Banking Corporation of Botswana Ltd v Kariba Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 2013 (6) SA 471 
(GNP). 
135 Ibid at paragraph 45. 
136 AJ van der Walt ‘Constitutional Property Law’ (2013) Annual Survey of South African Law 216 at 224.  
137 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic 
of South Africa, 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC). 
138 M du Bois (See note 102) 181. 
139 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at paragraph 75.  
140 M du Bois (See note 102) 178. 
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Du Bois notes further that in the FNB case 142 the Constitutional Court did not exclude 
intellectual property from constitutional protection and, therefore, impliedly accepted it to be 
property for the purposes of applying section 25.143  
 
This argument was confirmed some 10 years later in the case of Laugh It Off Promotions CC 
v SAB International (Finance).144 In this case the Constitutional Court noted that a 
trademark’s “. . . status is that of property albeit incorporeal”.145 In addition, the Court also 
noted that “like other property intellectual property does not enjoy special status under the 
Constitution. It is not immune from challenge and therefore its enforcement must be 
constitutionally tenable”.146 
 
Also reported in 2006, in the case of Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Limited v Gründlingh 
and Others147the Constitutional Court noted that the Supreme Court of Appeal148 accepted 
that “Phumelela’s business system constitutes property”149 whereafter the Constitutional 
Court continued its analysis by accepting this premise.150  
 
While it is implied that intellectual property does qualify as property, it too is subject to 
limitations when considering conflicts with other rights in the Constitution.  
 
3.9 Commercial interests and new property 
 
Apart from intellectual property, the courts have also held that commercial interests and even 
new property fall into the constitutional concept of property. Commercial interests include 
debts, goodwill and commercial licences, permits and quotas. New property includes socio-
                                                          
142 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC). 
143 M du Bois (See note 102) 186. 
144 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC). 
145 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v Sab International (Finance) Bv T/A Sabmark International (Freedom Of 
Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) at paragraphs 17 and 18, G to A. 
146 Ibid at paragraph 17 A to B. 
147 2006 (8) BCLR 883 (CC). 
148 When hearing the case Gründlingh and Others v Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Ltd 2005 (6) SA 502 
(SCA). 
149 2006 (8) BCLR 883 (CC), at paragraph 11. 
150 Phumelela Gaming and Leisure Limited v Gründlingh and Others 2006 (8) BCLR 883 (CC), at paragraphs 
41 and 42, where the court considers what test should be employed to assess whether the deprivation was 
arbitrary – a step which should only be taken once it is concluded that the object or right does constitute 
property.  
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economic or welfare rights which are afforded to the population on a large scale, for example, 
unemployment insurance paid by the state, child grants, professional licences or access to 
public resources.151  
 
Commercial interests were recognised for the first time in Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v 
Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, Environmental Affairs and 
Tourism, Eastern Cape152(hereafter referred to as Shoprite Checkers) and new property in 
Transkei Public Servants Association v Government of the Republic of South Africa.(hereafter 
referred to as ‘Transkei Public Servants Association case’ )153 In Shoprite Checkers the 
Constitutional Court held that a grocer’s wine licence falls into the constitutional concept of 
property and in Transkei Public Servants Association case the High Court held that a 
government housing subsidy falls into the constitutional definition of property.154 
 
The Shoprite Checker’s case is particularly significant, not only because it extended the 
constitutional concept of property to include commercial interests, but also because it adopted 
a normative approach to the interpretation of property. This normative approach will 
undoubtedly influence the interpretation of the constitutional concept of property and thus 
clause 1 of the Expropriation Bill in the future. This judgment is discussed in more detail 
below. 
 
3.10 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v MEC for Economic Development, Environmental 




In Shoprite Checkers 155 the issue concerning an entitlement to commercial trade granted in 
terms of a state licence was held to amount to property for the purpose of section 25.156 While 
there are other aspects to this case, this dissertation is focussed mainly on understanding the 
                                                          
151 CG van der Merwe (See note 18) at paragraph 15. 
152 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC). 
153 1995 BCLR 1235 (TK) 1246J. 
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155 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC). 
156 Ibid at paragraph 6. 
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ambit of what constitutes property for the purpose of section 25, hence it will not examine the 
other aspects in the analysis of this case.  
 
(b) The facts 
 
In 2003, the Eastern Cape government passed the Eastern Cape Liquor Act157 (the “ECLA”) 
which, as its name indicates, regulates the sale of alcohol in the province. Before the ECLA 
was passed, the sale of alcohol was regulated by the Liquor Act (the “Liquor Act”).158 In 
terms of the Liquor Act the applicant (“Shoprite Checkers”) held a so-called “grocer’s wine 
licence”, which allowed it to sell alcohol alongside food in the supermarkets it owned. The 
ECLA repealed the Liquor Act and abolished this licence. Instead of a grocer’s wine licence, 
the ECLA provided that Shoprite Checkers could apply for an “all-kinds licence”.159 This 
licence allowed a licence-holder to sell any kind of alcohol, but only in a separate dedicated 
bottle store and not in a supermarket together with food. 
 
After the relevant provisions of the ECLA came into effect, Shoprite Checkers applied to the 
Eastern Cape High Court for an order declaring the ECLA to be unconstitutional and invalid 
on the grounds that it unjustifiably infringed section 25(1) of the Constitution.160 The ECLA 
infringed section 25(1), Shoprite Checkers argued, because it arbitrarily deprived Shoprite 
Checkers of its property when it abolished Shoprite’s grocer’s wine licence. The High Court 
agreed with Shoprite Checkers and declared the relevant parts of the ECLA to be 
unconstitutional and invalid.161 It then referred its judgment to the Constitutional Court for 
confirmation in terms of section 172(2)(a) of the Constitution. 
 
(c) The judgment 
 
A majority of the Constitutional Court refused to confirm the High Court’s judgment. 
Instead, the majority found that while Shoprite Checker’s grocer’s wine licence could be 
                                                          
157 10 of 2003. 
158 27 of 1989. 
159 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraph 2. 
160 Ibid at paragraph 10. 
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Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraph 17. 
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classified as property, Shoprite had not been arbitrarily deprived of its licence by the ECLA 
and that the ECLA, therefore, was constitutionally valid. 
 
In arriving at this decision, the Court had to consider two key issues: first, whether Shoprite 
Checker’s grocer’s wine licence was property in terms of section 25(1); and, if it was, second, 
whether Shoprite Checkers had been arbitrarily deprived of its property. For the purposes of 
this dissertation it is only necessary to focus on the first question. Insofar as this question was 
concerned, the Constitutional Court split three ways. Two of the judgments (per Froneman 
and Madlanga JJ) found that the grocer’s wine licence was property, although for very 
different reasons, while the third judgment (per Moseneke DCJ) found that it was not. Each 
judgment will be considered in turn.  
 
(d) Froneman J’s values-based approach 
 
In his judgment Froneman J (Cameron J, Nkabinde J and Japie AJ concurring) found that 
Shoprite Checker’s grocer’s wine licence was property for the purposes of section 25(1) of 
the Constitution. 
 
In arriving at his decision, Froneman J began by explaining that the word property in section 
25(1) must be interpreted in a manner that promotes the fundamental values that underlie the 
Constitution and especially the values of human dignity, equality and freedom. In order to 
achieve this goal, the constitutional definition of property should include those rights and 
interests which a person needs in order to lead a life that is characterised by personal self-
fulfilment.162  
 
The notion of personal self-fulfilment in this context, however, does not refer to the 
maximization of economic wealth or the satisfaction of individual preferences. Instead, it 
refers to living a life filled with dignity. In addition, it was also important to note that where a 
right or interest does not only protect a person’s dignity, but also protects one of the other 
rights in the Bill of Rights, for example the right to freedom of trade which is guaranteed in 
section 23, it is even more likely that it will fall into the definition of constitutional 
                                                          
162 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraphs 45 to 50. 
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property.163 Froneman J discusses this in detail as follows:  
 
The objective normative values of the Constitution thus require us to determine what kind of 
property deserves protection under the property clause, by reference to the Constitution itself. 
The fundamental values of dignity, equality and freedom necessitate a conception of property 
that allows, on the one hand, for individual self-fulfilment in the holding of property, and, on 
the other hand, the recognition that the holding of property also carries with it a social 
obligation not to harm the public good. The function that the protection of holding property 
must thus, broadly, serve is the attainment of this socially-situated individual self-fulfilment. 
The function of personal self-fulfilment in this sense is not primarily to advance economic 
wealth maximization or the satisfaction of individual preference, but to secure living a life of 
dignity in recognition of the dignity of others. And where the holding of property is related to 
the exercise, protection or advancement of particular individual rights under the Bill of 
Rights, the level of protection afforded to that holding will be stronger than where no relation 
of that kind exists.164  
 
After setting out this values-based approach, Froneman J turned to apply it to the facts. In this 
respect he began by explaining that while a grocer’s wine licence does not protect Shoprite 
Checker’s dignity or freedom to trade because Shoprite Checkers is neither a human being 
nor a citizen, it may protect a natural person’s right to dignity or a citizen’s right to trade. 
This would occur when the licence was held by a person who owned a small grocery store 
and who needed to sell wine together with groceries in order for his or her business to 
succeed.165   
 
Apart from protecting the right to dignity and the right to trade of such a person, Froneman J 
explained, a grocer’s wine licence also has many of the characteristics of the private law or 
common law concept of property. It is valuable, it exists for an indefinite period, it can be 
transferred subject to administrative approval and it can only be withdrawn under certain 
prescribed conditions.166 In light of all of these factors, Froneman J went on to find, a 
grocer’s wine licence is property for the purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution. 
 
                                                          
163 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraphs 45 to 50. 
164 Ibid at paragraph 50 
165 Ibid at paragraph 64. 
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If a natural person had been in the position of Shoprite, she would have had an easier task of 
convincing a court that the grocer’s wine licence granted by the State enabled her to conduct a 
business vocation of her choice that was essential to her living a life of dignity in that there 
was a ‘relationship between [her] work and [her] human personality as a whole’. So the 
correct question to ask, as noted above, is whether her interest in the business licence would 
qualify as property protected by section 25(1). This is still an objective enquiry. It is not the 
subjective assertion of the person involved that determines the outcome, but the court’s 
assessment of the objective value of that assertion. I do not find it too difficult to imagine that 
a person who wishes to run a small business might have found the opportunity to run a 
grocery store, with the added advantage of selling wine, as the single chance to run a business 
successfully, without which it might otherwise have been difficult to do so. But it would, 
objectively, be a step too far to say that it would be impossible to do so.167 
 
Having found that the grocer’s wine licence was property, Froneman J turned to consider 
whether Shoprite Checkers had been deprived of its property by the ECLA and, if so, whether 
the ECLA was arbitrary. In this respect he found that while Shoprite had been deprived of its 
property by the ECLA, the ECLA was not arbitrary. The ECLA, therefore, was 
constitutionally valid. 
 
(e) Madlanga J’s attributes-based approach 
 
In his judgment, Madlanga J (Tshiqi AJ concurring) also found that a grocer’s wine licence is 
property for the purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution, but for different reasons.  
 
In arriving at his decision, Madlanga J began by criticising the approach adopted by 
Froneman J on the grounds that it did not give the concept of property its own independent 
meaning. Instead, it relied very heavily on the right to dignity and the right to freedom of 
trade to give meaning to the concept of property. The problem with this approach is that it 
watered down the right to property to the point where it simply rides on the coat-tails of other 
rights. It is no longer a self-standing right. 
 
Instead of basing the constitutional concept of property on the relationship between property 
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Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraph 64. 
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and other rights in the Bill of Rights such as human dignity and the freedom to trade, 
Madlanga J explained further, the constitutional concept of property should be based on the 
same attributes that the common law concept of property is based, namely: whether the 
object, right or interest in question has value, whether it is permanent, whether it can be 
transferred and whether it can be withdrawn.   
 
After setting out this attributes-based approach, Madlanga J then applied it to the facts and 
found that a grocer’s wine licence does display the characteristics he identified in his 
judgment: 
 
[the grocer’s wine licence] grants the holder an entitlement to sell wine under certain 
specified circumstances. The licence may endure indefinitely. Even though it may be 
suspended or cancelled, that may not be done at whim. There are circumscribed grounds; and 
they must be applied in accordance with the strictures of just administrative action as 
provided for in PAJA. It is not without significance that, from the time they were granted, 
Shoprite’s licences were never cancelled. And Shoprite had been trading in accordance 
therewith. Also, a grocer’s wine licence holds objective commercial value: its very raison 
d’etre is to trade in accordance with its conditions. The licence is transferable, albeit subject 
to that being sanctioned by the authorities. As an item of objective economic value, the 
transfer may even be for a valuable consideration (quid pro quo). Indeed, the value of 
Shoprite itself (or that of its individual stores) as a commercial entity may well be enhanced 
by the fact that Shoprite holds grocer’s wine licences. All these point to the grocer’s wine 
licence being property for the purposes of section 25(1) 168 
 
Having found that the grocer’s wine licence was property, Madlanga J turned to consider 
whether Shoprite Checkers had been deprived of its property by the ECLA and, if so, whether 
the ECLA was arbitrary. In this respect he found that Shoprite Checkers had been deprived of 
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(f) Moseneke’s dissenting approach 
 
In his dissenting approach Moseneke DCJ (Mogoeng CJ, Khampepe J, Molemela AJ and 
Theron AJ concurring) found that it was not necessary to determine whether a grocer’s wine 
licence is property for the purposes of section 25(1). This is because rather than testing the 
validity of the ECLA against section 25(1) of the Constitution, it should preferably be tested 
against the principle of legality and especially the requirement of rationality which is an 
incident of the rule of law.169 
 
Nonetheless, Moseneke DCJ proceeded to assess what could constitute property170 and 
conducted a comparative analysis of other jurisdictions to aid in determining the answer.171 In 
light of this comparative analysis he concluded that the “entitlement to commercial trade 
under a state licence does not fit comfortably within the constitutional notions of 
property”.172 The reasons for this were that a license is simply permission to carry out a trade 
that would otherwise be unlawful, it is conditional, subject to withdrawal, not freely 
transferrable and has time limits which are not characteristics which normally be associated 
with property.173 
 
The Shoprite Checkers case is therefore significant because it confirms that the definition of 
property for the purposes of section 25 extends beyond the narrow common law perceptions 




The constitutional jurisprudence reveals many examples of what may constitute property for 
the purpose of section 25 of the Constitution. It is important for the purpose of this 
dissertation that it is borne in mind that the following are therefore property as per the 
Constitution: movable and immovable corporeal property, incorporeal things in terms of 
common law, customary law and legislation (e.g. trademarks and business systems), and most 
recently a form of “new property”, a grocer’s wine license, has been accepted as property. 
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As Van der Walt has pointed out, the common law does not confer the power on the state to 
expropriate property, even subject to the payment of compensation. 174 This means that the 
state may only expropriate property if the power to do so has been conferred upon it by 
legislation.175 While a wide range of statutes do presently confer the power on the state to 
expropriate property,176 the most prominent of these is the Expropriation Act. This Act, 
however, is set to be repealed and replaced by the Expropriation Bill 2015 when it comes into 
operation. The purpose of this chapter is to set out and discuss some of the key provisions of 
this Act. In addition, the purpose of this chapter is to set out and discuss the process leading 
up to the drafting and adoption of the Expropriation Bill 2015. Finally, the purpose of this 
chapter is also to set out and discuss the definitions of property in clause 1 of the Bill, to 
consider its implications and to examine some of the alternative definitions that have been 
proposed by interested parties.  
 
4.2 The Expropriation Act 
 
The Expropriation Act was assented to on the 20 June 1975 and commenced operation on the 
1 January 1977.177 Although it was drafted, enacted and brought into operation during the 
apartheid era it was preserved by section 229 of the Interim Constitution read together with 
Item 2 on Schedule 6 of the Constitution and remains a valid Act of Parliament. It is 
interesting to note, however, that it has not been amended since the transition to democracy in 
1994 when Proclamation R41 was gazetted.178 
 
The Expropriation Act sets out the full process for an expropriation,179 including determining 
the authorities which may expropriate180 and the steps to be followed by both the authority 
and the owner of the property to be expropriated in negotiating the compensation and 
                                                          
174 AJ van der Walt Constitutional property law 3ed (2011) at 454.  
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payment of the compensation to the dispossessed owner. 181 For the purpose of this 
dissertation, it is necessary only to assess what constitutes property in terms of for the 
Expropriation Act for purpose of determining the scope of its application.  
 
Property is defined in section 1 the Expropriation Act as “both movable and immovable 
property”.182 Unfortunately, the Act itself does not define what is meant by movable and 
immovable property.183 Southwood, however, argues that the ordinary meaning in the context 
should be given to the meaning of property for the Expropriation Act.184 Relying on the 
definition of property given in Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Estate Crewe and 
Another,185 he goes on to conclude that property means “vested rights with a pecuniary or 
economic value”.186 Apart from vested rights with a pecuniary or economic value, it has been 
held that the ordinary meaning of property includes intangible property, such as real rights 
and creditors’ rights.187 
 
Given that the Expropriation Act was drafted, passed and brought into operation during the 
apartheid era, it is not surprising that it suffers from a number of deficiencies. Among the 
most important of these is that it is not consistent with section 25(3) of the Constitution, 
which provides that compensation must be just and equitable whereas the Act provides that 
compensation must be market value. Section 25(4) of the Constitution provides that property 
means more than land and may include new property as discussed in Chapter 3, whereas the 
Expropriation Act provides that property is limited to movable and immovable property. The 
Expropriation Act also does not give effect to the transformatory goals of the Constitution in 
general and section 25 in particular. 
 
In order to address these deficiencies in the Expropriation Act, the Department of Public 
Works began a long and complex process of drafting a new Expropriation Act. This process 
may be traced back to the draft policy on expropriation which was published in 2007. 
Following the publication of the draft policy, an Expropriation Bill was first published in 
2008. This Bill, however, was never enacted and five years later it was replaced with a 
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second Expropriation Bill in 2013. Once again this Bill was never enacted and two years later 
it was replaced with a third Expropriation Bill in 2015. Although this Bill has been passed by 
both Houses of Parliament is has not been assented to by the President. 
 
The draft policy on expropriation, the 2008 Bill and the 2013 Bill will be discussed in turn, 
starting with the draft policy. 
 




A draft policy on expropriation entitled Expropriate For Public Purpose in the Public 
Interest was published by the Department of Public Works on 13 November 2007.188 In this 
22 page document the Department introduced the reader to the history of South Africa’s land 
dispossession and the property clause in the Constitution.189 The Department thereafter noted 
the objects of the policy framework and the existing framework, before surveying other 
jurisdictions and finally setting out the principles upon which a new Expropriation Act should 
be based.190 For the purpose of this dissertation, however, it is not necessary to discuss the 
draft policy in detail. Instead, it will be prudent to focus only on those parts of the draft policy 
that deal with the legislative framework, the challenges faced by the legislative framework 
and the principles which should be applied when drafting of a new Expropriation Act.  
 
(b) The legislative framework and its challenges 
 
Insofar as the legislative framework is concerned, the draft policy begins by outlining the 
provisions of section 25(2) of the Constitution and by noting that the Expropriation Act is in 
force and effect.191  
 
It then goes on to argue that the provisions of the Expropriation Act are not consistent with 
                                                          
188 Notice 1654 in Government Gazette No. 30468 published 13 November 2007. 
189 See headings A and B in Notice 1654 in Government Gazette No. 30468 published 13 November 2007 at 2-
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the provisions of section 25 and, in particular, that they are not consistent with:  
 
(i)  section 25(3) which introduces new factors to be taken into account when determining 
the amount to be paid for compensation;192 and  
(ii)  section 25(4) which provides that property is not limited to land and that it may 
include all of South Africa’s natural resources.193 
 
Apart from the fact that the Expropriation Act is incompatible with section 25 of the 
Constitution, the draft policy argues that it needs to be revised for other reasons as well. 
Among these are: first, that the Expropriation Act predates the Constitution and thus lacks the 
transformative intention of the Constitution; and, second, that the Expropriation Act is 
inconsistent with other comparable statutes from around the world.194 
 




Insofar as the principles which should be applied when drafting of a new Expropriation Act 
are concerned, the draft policy identifies five such principles. These are as follows: 
(i)  A new Expropriation Act should allow for expropriation in the public interest. 
(ii)  A new Expropriation Act should allow for compensation to holders of specified 
unregistered rights. 
(iii)  A new Expropriation Act should align the calculation of compensation with the 
factors mentioned in section 25(3) of the Constitution. 
(iv)  A new Expropriation Act should create a common framework which includes certain 
minimum norms and standards in relation to which authorities have powers to 
expropriate. 
(v)  A new Expropriation Act should outline three separate phases and mechanisms for 
each phase which will enable the practical process of expropriation to proceed. These 
phases should include the following:  
 First, the decision to expropriate. This decision should be informed by 
consultations with all interested parties and be based on relevant information.  
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 Second, the process of expropriation. This process should require notices of 
particular standards.  
 Third, the process of agreeing on or determining compensation. Compensation 
should be just and equitable.196 
 
4.4 The Expropriation Bill 2008197  
 
Following the publication of the draft policy on expropriation, the Department of Public 
Works published an Expropriation Bill198 (B16-2008) together with an Explanatory Summary 
in 2008. Although the Department claimed that this Bill was drafted after consulting both 
organs of state and the private sector,199 it was severely criticised and eventually withdrawn 
from the parliamentary process due to a lack of public consultation.200 
 
Property was defined in clause 1 of this Bill as “includes a right in property and includes 
movable property”.201 Although worded differently, this definition did not appear to 
introduce any significant changes to the manner in which property was defined in the 
Expropriation Act. It simply highlighted the fact that both objects and the rights that pertain 
to those objects could be expropriated. 
  
4.5 The Expropriation Bill 2013202 
 
Five years after the 2008 Expropriation Bill was published and then withdrawn, the 2013 
Expropriation Bill was published.203 Like the 2008 Expropriation Bill, this Bill came under 
substantial criticism for various reasons. In light of these criticisms it was never introduced in 
Parliament and was ultimately withdrawn from the parliamentary process.  
                                                          
196 The summary below is based upon the principles outlined in Notice 1654 in Government Gazette No. 30468 
published 13 November 2007 at 16-21. 
197 Expropriation Bill B16-2008, ISBN 978-1-77037-193-4 in Government Gazette No. 30963 published 11 
April 2008. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Memorandum on the objects of the Expropriation Bill 2008 annexed to Expropriation Bill B16-2008, ISBN 
978-1-77037-193-4 in Government Gazette No. 30963 published 11 April 2008.. 
200 L Donnelly “Expropriation Bill Shelved 'for Fear of Backlash” published 09 September 2008, available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-09-expropriation-bill-shelved-for-fear-of-backlash accessed 25 October 2016  
201 Expropriation Bill B16-2008, ISBN 978-1-77037-193-4 Government Gazette No. 30963 published 11 April 
2008. 
202 Notice 234 in Government Gazette No. 36269 published 20 March 2013.   
203 Ibid.   
49 
 
Property was defined in clause 1 of this Bill as “not limited to land and includes a right in or 
to such property”.204 Once again, although this definition was worded differently from both 
the Expropriation Act and the Expropriation Bill, it did not appear to introduce any 
significant changes to the manner in which property was defined in either of those 
instruments.  
  
4.6 The Expropriation Bill 2015 205 
 
Two years after the 2013 Expropriation Bill was withdrawn the 2015 Expropriation Bill was 
published for public comment. Although this Bill also came under substantial criticism for 
various reasons, unlike the 2008 and 2013 Bills it was eventually passed by both Houses of 
Parliament and then sent to the President for his assent and signature. Acting in terms of 
section 79 of the Constitution, however, the President has referred the Bill back to Parliament 
for reconsideration. In his referral the President indicated that he has reservations about the 
constitutional validity of certain sections of the Bill as well as the process that was followed 
by Parliament.206  
 
When the 2015 Bill was first introduced in Parliament, property was defined in clause 1 of 
the Bill as “not limited to land and includes a right in such property”. 207 This definition was 
very similar to the one contain in the 2013 Bill which included the words “or to”. During the 
Parliamentary process, however, the definition of property was amended and in the final 
version that was passed by Parliament property was defined in clause 1 as “property as 





                                                          
204 Clause 1 of the Expropriation Bill 2013 Notice 234 in Government Gazette No. 36269 published 20 March 
2013. 
205 B -2015 explanatory summary published in Government Gazette No. 38418 published 26 January 2015. 
206 See: http://www.polity.org.za/article/cosatu-cosatu-statement-on-the-presidents-decision-to-send-back-the-
expropriation-bill-2016-07-26 - accessed 27 October 2016. 
207 Clause 1 of Expropriation Bill B-2015 published in Government Gazette No. 38418 published 26 January 
2015. 
208 Expropriation Bill B4D-2015, ISBN 978-1-4850-0314-4. 
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As discussed above, property is defined in the final version of the 2015 Expropriation Bill as 
“property as contemplated in section 25 of the Constitution”.209 The scope and ambit of this 
definition is considered below.  
 
(b) The ordinary grammatical meaning  
 
The ordinary grammatical meaning of the definition of property in clause 1 of the final 
version of the 2015 Expropriation Bill is that property for the purposes of the Bill has the 
same meaning as property for the purposes of section 25 of the Constitution.  
 
The ordinary grammatical meaning of this definition makes it clear that it is not a definition 
in and of itself, but rather simply a signpost that refers the interpreter to the Constitution to 
continue his or her search for the meaning of property.  
 
The interpreter would then be forgiven, in order to understand what can be the subject of 
expropriation, for logically turning to section 25 of the Constitution to attempt to find the 
definition of property.  
 
The interpreter would then confusingly find that the Constitution simply does not provide any 
direct or in-text definition for what exactly constitutes property. The only reference to what 
constitutes property is contained in section 25(4) which simply states that “property is not 
limited to land”.  
 
Without any further reading on the topic, the interpreter would therefore only be able to 
conclude that the meaning of property would simply be that it is not limited to land. The 
interpreter would need to research constitutional jurisprudence to understand the very object 
of the Expropriation Bill.  
 
                                                          
209 Clause 1 Expropriation Bill B4D-2015, ISBN 978-1-4850-0314-4. 
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(c) The constitutional meaning 
 
The Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and requires “an interpretive approach 
which, while paying due regard to the language that has been used, is ‘generous’ and 
‘purposive’ and gives expression to the underlying values of the Constitution”,210 as was 
outlined in the case of Ferreira v Levin N.O. and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell N.O. 
and others.211  
 
Our Constitution requires a purposive approach to statutory interpretation as noted in Bato 
Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others,212 where 
it was held that “[t]he technique of paying attention to context in statutory construction is 
now required by the Constitution, in particular, s 39(2) . . . that provision introduces a 
mandatory requirement to construe every piece of legislation in a manner that promotes the 
‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’.”213 Ngcobo J continues by lamenting that an 
interpretative process should not focus simply on the ordinary meaning of the words, but also 
takes into account the “colour given to language by the context”.214  
 
Chapter Three of this dissertation examined the scope of what may constitute property for the 
purpose of the Constitution and the rationale therefor. For the purpose of this portion of the 
dissertation, it is best to simply summarise the findings by citing the conclusion of Chapter 
Three:  
 
… the following are therefore ‘property’ as per the Constitution: movable and immovable 
corporeal property, incorporeal things in terms of common law, customary law and legislation 
(e.g. trademarks and business systems), and most recently a form of “new property”, being a 
grocer’s wine license, has been accepted to be property.215 
 
 
                                                          
210 Ferreira v Levin N.O. and others; Vryenhoek and others v Powell N.O. and others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at 
paragraph 46. 
211 Ibid. 
212 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA 490 
(CC). 
213 Ibid at paragraph 91. 
214 Ibid at paragraph 92. 
215 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
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4.8 The Expropriation Bill vs the Expropriation Act 
 
The in-text definition of property in the Expropriation Act still extended beyond the 
immediately obvious as the meaning of movable and immovable property. It extended to 
vested rights with an economic value and so would include the likes of intellectual property 
and shares.216 
 
The Expropriation Bill 2015 has a somewhat wider definition of property, which is also 
evolving as new cases are decided by the Constitutional Court. Of particular interest is that 
concept of “new property” which, with the definition of property as contained in the Bill, 
now also will be the subject matter of expropriation.  
 




Now that the groundwork has been laid for understanding the history of the development of 
the new Expropriation Bill, as well an interpretation of the possible meaning of property in 
the context of the private law and constitutional jurisprudence, it would be prudent to 
consider some of the implications which this law may have for the people of South Africa.  
 
(b) Uncertainty for foreign investors  
 
The definition of property has been different in each version of the Expropriation Bill so far 
presented for public comment and parliamentary consideration. Further to this, the definition 
of what constitutes property is not clearly spelt out in the legislation itself.  
 
The referral to the Constitution in the most recent draft does not resolve any of the practical 
problems many investors have surrounding understanding the very object of the Bill – what 
may be expropriated. This uncertainty and the further uncertainty surrounding the growing 
list of  what may constitute property in terms of section 25 of the Constitution causes a lack 
of confidence in the security of investments made in South Africa and hence this 
                                                          
216 MD Southwood (See note 183) at 47. 
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Expropriation Bill 2015 serves as a deterrent to foreign investment.217 
  
As evidenced by this dissertation, an in-depth enquiry is required to ascertain the very object 
of the Expropriation Bill 2015. It is submitted that this illustrates how the uncertainty may 
impact a foreign investor who looks for safeguards for property rights before concluding a 
decision to invest.218  
 
(c) Opening flood gates to court challenges 
 
In Shoprite Checkers 219 the main judgment accepted that a grocer’s licence to sell wine 
constituted property for the purposes of section 25.  
 
In commenting on this conclusion Moseneke DCJ briefly introduced the floodgates argument 
when he stated: 
 
The main judgment may very well create very difficult property jurisprudence. The wider the 
definition of property, the tighter our understanding of deprivation and arbitrariness will have 
to be. Would every change in a licensing law possibly attract a Constitutional challenge based 
on the property clause like the one now in our hands? . . . Also, if a province were to 
terminate a class of licences, would that amount to expropriation that entitled the holders to 
compensation?220 
 
The questions posed above are legitimate concerns because if a court decision creates a wide 
category of “new property” and the state was to attempt to expropriate such property, then the 
courts may face increased volumes of litigation to resolve these disputes. A tighter definition 
of property could arguably decrease the threat of such litigation in addition to giving foreign 
investors confidence in the protection of their investments.  
                                                          
217 see L Donnelly “Crippled SA Loses Another Crutch” published 31 Jul 2015 available at 
http://mg.co.za/article/2015-07-30-crippled-sa-loses-another-crutch/ accessed on 25 May 2016 and S Nkabinde 
“SA Policies Headache for US Companies BBBEE and Lack of Skills are Biggest Concerns for American 
Businesses in SA.” published 4 July 2015 available at https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/economy/local-
policy-headaches-us-companies/ accessed on 25 May 2016. 
218 C Smith “Beware of Impact of New Laws on Investment - Chamber” published 5 February 2016, available at 
http://www.fin24.com/Economy/beware-of-impact-of-new-laws-on-investment-chamber-20160205 accessed 25 
May 2016. 
219 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraph 125. 
220 Ibid at paragraph 148. 
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(d) Inadequate processes to accommodate different types of property 
  
While the Expropriation Bill 2015 makes provisions for the situation “if property is land”,221  
there are no processes for other kinds of property which may require special actions to be 
taken to assess, inspect or pass transfer thereof to the state. By way of an example, if a person 
is the owner of a trademark as their intellectual property, but they are hypothetically served 
with a notice of expropriation, the processes of the Bill does not provide for the Companies 
and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) to be notified in order to update the Register of 
Trademarks.  
 




It is only to be expected, where property rights are concerned and public interest has been 
stirred, that civic organisations or political parties would create alternative definitions which 
they believe would be better than the proposed definition. Below are two such alternative 
definitions for property which were recommended by the interested parties discussed.  
 
(b) South African Institute for Race Relations 
 
The South African Institute for Race Relations (SAIRR) is a non-profit organisation which 
was established in 1929 to “oppose racial discrimination and promote racial goodwill. Its 
current objects are to promote democracy, human rights, development, and reconciliation 
between the peoples of South Africa”.222 
 
The SAIRR has made several recommendations over the course of the development of the 
Expropriation Bill 2015, even producing their own “better” Expropriation Bill for the 
                                                          
221 See clauses 5(2), 5(5)(b), 7(4)(b)-(c), 8(2)(c), 14(1)(d), 14(2), 232)(b) and 24(2)(b). 
222 South African Institute of Race Relations “Petition to President on Expropriation Bill” published on 27 May 
2016, available at http://irr.org.za/reports-and-publications/submissions-on-proposed-legislation/petition-to-
president-on-expropriation-bill-2013-27-may-2016 accessed 19 January 2017. 
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consideration of politicians.223 In this draft, the Institute has put forward an alternative 
definition for property which it argues is constitutionally compliant, namely:  
 
Property means movable and immovable property; mining and water rights; mortgages, 
servitudes, and other registered rights; shares or debentures in companies; and patent and 
other intellectual property rights. 224 
  
This definition would make an interpreter’s interpretation of what may be property far easier 
than necessitating in-depth and time consuming research to understand the object of the 
Expropriation Bill.  
 
(c) Democratic Alliance 
 
While the United Democratic Movement (UDM) also opposed the definition of property in 
the Expropriation Bill 2015, the only political party to put forward an alternative definition 
was the Democratic Alliance.225 The definition put forward was: 
 
Property for the purposes of this Act shall be limited to: any land; any interest in land; 
immovable real rights in land including the right of a lessee of the land but shall exclude 
intangible commercial interests, including, but not limited to securities as defined in the 
Financial Markets Act 19 of 2013, shares as defined by the Companies Act 71 of 2008, 
contractual rights such as revenue sharing contracts, concession and other similar contracts, 
intellectual property rights such as copyrights, patents, trademarks, trade and business secrets, 
any rights conferred by law to conduct economic and commercial activities including 
licenses, permits and authorisations.226  
 
The rationale for this opposition was further expounded when written opposition to the final 
version of the Expropriation Bill was submitted. This written opposition stated:  
                                                          
223 South African Institute of Race Relations “The IRR’s Alternative Expropriation Amendment Bill: A 
Framework Document” published on 22 April 2015, available at http://irr.org.za/reports-and-
publications/occasional-reports/files/the-irrs-better-expropriation-bill-2013-22-april-2015 accessed 10 
November 2016. 
224 Ibid. 
225 BAD Martins “Report of the Portfolio Committee on Public Works on the Expropriation Bill [B 4 – 2015]” 
published in Parliament of Republic of South Africa, Announcements, Tablings And Committee Reports No 
5─2016 8 February 2016 available at 





Section 25(4)(b) [of the Constitution] expressly states that property is not “limited to land” 
but does not give a precise definition. This definition is arguably too broad and creates a great 
deal of uncertainty as to what the state may expropriate…It is proposed that if there is certain 
property that is not subject to expropriation, then such property must be expressly stated so as 
to avoid uncertainty and the repercussions this will have for investment in our economy.227 
 
This definition of property is narrower than the SAIRR’s definition and certainly more 




The ability to expropriate is a power of the state created through legislation. Presently, the 
Expropriation Act is the framework which provides for such expropriations. To date, efforts 
have been made to produce a new Expropriation Act which is in line with the values of the 
Constitution. Various versions of a new Act have been tabled and withdrawn, but the latest 
version, the Expropriation Bill has been passed by the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces.  
 
The definition of property throughout this development has changed with every redraft or 
tabling which has created a large amount of uncertainty. While interested civic organisations 
or opposition political parties have also produced definitions of property for consideration as 
worthy alternatives, these were rejected. The implications of the accepted definition are 
uncertain and therefore it would be best at this juncture to consider the practical difficulties 







                                                          
227 A Dreyer “The Democratic Alliance in the National Council of Provinces, hereby objects to the following 
definitions and/or clauses of the Expropriation Bill [B4D -2015], we request that our objections are recorded so 
as to reflect our opposition to the aforementioned Bill.” Published on 11 May 2016 available at 
https://pmg.org.za/files/160511DA_submission.docx accessed 25 January 2017. 
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CHAPTER FIVE – ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The principle concern of this final chapter will be to contrast the definition of property in the 
Expropriation Bill228 with the definition of property in the Expropriation Act and consider 
other definitions advanced by interested parties before considering possible implications of 
the definition as it stands.  
 
5.2 The different definitions of property 
 
The Expropriation Bill, which was passed by the National Assembly and the National 
Council of Provinces, defines property as “property as contemplated in section 25 of the 
Constitution”.229  The existing Expropriation Act defines property as “both movable and 
immovable property”.230 It extends to vested rights with an economic value and thus 
intellectual property and shares may also be included. 231 
 
The definition of property in the Expropriation Bill is wider than the existing Expropriation 
Act because it extends to anything which can be classified as property in terms of section 25 
of the Constitution. The scope of the Expropriation Act, therefore, could be considered to be 
settled whereas the Expropriation Bill’s scope is not settled and will not become settled 
anytime soon unless either another definition for property is employed, or our constitutional 
jurisprudence is developed in such a manner as to create a closed definition of what 
constitutes property for the purposes of section 25 of the Constitution.  
 
5.3 The practical difficulty posed by a lack of an “in-text” definition 
 
An interpreter of the Expropriation Bill, as mentioned before, will not find a concrete 
definition of property in the Bill itself and will only be informed to consult section 25 of the 
Constitution itself to find one.  
 
                                                          
228 Expropriation Bill B4D-2015, ISBN 978-1-4850-0314-4. 
229 Section 1 Expropriation Bill B4D-2015, ISBN 978-1-4850-0314-4.  
230 Section 1 of the Expropriation Act 63 of 1975. 
231 MD Southwood (See note 183) at 47. 
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The Constitution itself also does not define the concept of property other than to state that it 
is “not limited to land” in section 25(4). It is necessary, therefore, in order to understand what 
property is, to conduct a wide search of constitutional jurisprudence. Only after this lengthy 
investigation can the very object of the Expropriation Bill be understood.  
 
This will prove to be a difficulty for the ordinary law-abiding citizen or foreign investor who 
wishes to understand what constitutes property that may be the subject of an expropriation, 
but who has no formal legal or similar education to assist them with this enquiry.  
 
5.4 Property for the purpose of section 25  
 
It is prudent at this point to revisit the case law on the subject to identity what is accepted to 
be property for the purposes of section 25 of the Constitution. With reference to Chapter 
Three of this dissertation, the conclusion can be brought forward that corporeal things such as 
movable and immovable property,232 real rights and certain types of creditors’ rights,233 
intellectual property rights234 and more recently certain statutory rights235 all constitute 
property for the purposes of section 25 of the Constitution.  
 
While this provides an answer to the reader of this dissertation, it does not resolve the 
practical difficulty encountered by the ordinary citizen who is searching for what may be 
property for the purpose of this Bill. 
 
5.5 Impact of the constitutional definition of property on the Expropriation Bill 
 
While the Expropriation Act arguably included real rights, creditors’ rights and intellectual 
property rights, it did not include statutory rights and interests linked thereto. As it presently 
stands, the definition of property in the Expropriation Bill is significantly wider than the 
definition of property in the Expropriation Act, especially taking into account the recent 
                                                          
232 First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC), at paragraph 51. 
233 Law Society of South Africa and Others v Minister for Transport and Another 2011 1 SA 400 (CC) and 
National Credit Regulator v Opperman and Others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC). 
234 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v Sab International (Finance) Bv T/A Sabmark International (Freedom Of 
Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC) at paragraphs 17 and 18, G to A. 
235 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC). 
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decision of the Constitutional Court in the Shoprite Checkers case.  
 
The result of the Expropriation Bill directly importing the definition of property as defined in 
terms of section 25 of the Constitution is that the definition of what may be property will also 
be evolving and possibly expanding as more cases are heard by the courts. The scope of what 
may be the subject of expropriated will resultantly also be growing, whether or not the 
legislation is adequately drafted to handle this theoretically increasing scope is another 
question altogether. 
 
5.6 The purpose for no explicit definition of property in the Constitution 
 
The Constitutional Court has discussed, from time to time, why there is no explicit definition 
of property in the Constitution. Below are extracts which summarise the position of the 
Court. 
 
In the FNB case, it held that:  
 
“The purpose of s25 has to be seen both as protecting existing private property rights as well 
as serving the public interest, mainly in the sphere of land reform but not limited thereto, and 
also as striking a proportionate balance between these two functions”. 236 
 
This rationale lead to the conclusion that:  
 
“At this stage of our Constitutional jurisprudence it is … practically impossible to furnish - 
and judicially unwise to attempt - a comprehensive definition of property for purposes of 
s25”. 237  
 
When revisiting this topic, the Constitutional Court, in the case of Law Society of South 
Africa and Others v Minister for Transport and Another concluded that: 
 
For present purposes let it suffice to state that the definition of property for purposes of 
Constitutional protection should not be too wide to make legislative regulation impracticable 
                                                          
236 First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another; 
First National Bank of SA Ltd T/A Wesbank v Minister of Finance 2002 (4) SA 768 (CC) at paragraph 50. 
237 Ibid at paragraph 51. 
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and not too narrow to render the protection of property of little worth. In many disputes, 
courts will readily find that a particular asset of value or resource is recognised and protected 
by law as property . . .  238 (my emphasis added).  
 
The above quotes inform the conclusion that the Constitution balances the protection of 
private property and the need for the public interest to be served through processes that are 
aimed at redress and transformation of our society. The question to be asked, in light of the 
above, is whether a Bill which seeks to limit private property rights should simply import a 
wide and evolving definition of property that is developed on a case by case basis? 
 




The most recent case which has discussed this issue must be examined in addition to the case 
law cited above. The difficulties which arise in the case of Shoprite Checkers 239 need to be 
considered.  
 
The first difficulty is in ascertaining whether this judgment could be applied to other statutory 
rights, such as fishing licenses, water use licenses or licenses to operate taxis on specified 
routes. The door has now been opened for consideration, but it appears that the approach may 
be to assess each instance on its facts.  
 
The second difficulty, being one in need of expounding upon, is that there is still no certainty 
as to what methodology or criteria should be applied by courts in future to determine what the 
test is for whether something constitutes property for section 25 of the Constitution.  
 
Two separate methodologies were considered for determining whether a statutory right 
granted through licensing procedure, could constitute property. The first method, employed 
by Froneman J, is what could be referred to as “a values-based approach” and the second 
                                                          
238 Law Society of South Africa and Others v Minister of Transport and Another 2011 (1) SA 400 (CC) at 
paragraphs 83 to 84. 
239 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC). 
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approach, adopted by Madlanga J, could be referred to as an “attributes-based approach”.  
 
(b) The values-based approach  
 
Froneman J began his analysis by pointing out that an entitlement to trade under a state-
granted licence “does not sit comfortably with private law notions of property”,240 but that in 
order to determine what property is for the purposes of section 25 a court must heed the values of 
the Constitution. This is because it is duty bound to interpret the Bill of Rights to “promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom”.241 Froneman J then assessed the values of human dignity and freedom to choose a 
vocation which he argued should be used to determine which objects, rights and interests 
deserved constitutional protection.242  
 
In terms of this values-based approach, therefore, it may be said that the concept of property 
should not be limited to the existing private law notions, but rather that it should be extended to 
align with constitutional entitlements so as to not become an obstacle to transformation in 
South Africa.243  
 
Therefore the “objective normative values”244 of the Constitution such as dignity, equality and 
freedom would necessitate defining property in such a way as to both allow for individual 
self-fulfilment and to fulfil the social obligation not to harm the public good.245 Froneman J 
referred to the illuminating approach of the German courts as foreign law that substantiated 
his point by showing that the protection of property need not be premised on an economic 
theory of property – which has the satisfaction of the individual or their preferences at its 
core. 246 
 
Froneman J then later proceeded to note that the characteristics of a liquor license were close 
to the private law grounds used to recognise property and that the “potential objective link to 
                                                          
240Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraph 41. 
241 Ibid at paragraphs 43 and 44. 
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constitutionally sanctioned self-fulfilment only strengthens the case for recognition of it as 
property”.247 It was however noted that both Agri SA and FNB have clarified that the 
commercial value of the right does not have a determinative role to help determine whether 
the right constitutes property for section 25.  
 
In summary, Froneman J’s approach was to assess whether recognising the object, right or 
interest as property would allow for individual self-fulfilment taking into account the values 
of the Constitution when making this determination but also disregarding the commercial 
value of the object, right or interest.  
 
In applying the values of the Constitution, Froneman J created an ideal litigant for him to 
apply his reasoning to. He questioned that, if a woman who possessed the grocer’s license 
which enabled her to conduct her vocation of her choice was in the position of Shoprite, 
would that business licence qualify as property protected under section 25(1)?248 He 
concluded that the holding of the license by a natural person may well then constitute 
property because nothing in the Act regulating the licenses “suggest(s) that a licence of this 
kind cannot be held by a person who needs it to live a life of individual self-fulfilment and 
reciprocal dignity to others”.249  
 
The complication with this approach is that it can be argued that Shoprite is not dependent on 
selling wine for its livelihood which gives rise to its self-fulfilment and dignity. Shoprite is a 
large company which enjoys multiple profit streams. At most, losing its license is 
inconvenient and necessitates that it reapplies for it.  
 
It is also regrettable that the values based inquiry, while helpful to the development of 
constitutional jurisprudence, is not in the form of a succinct definitive test that can be applied 
to determine what property is. This approach may also, in the words of Moseneke DCJ, “very 
well create very difficult property jurisprudence”.250 
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(c) The attributes-based approach 
 
Moseneke DCJ stated that the issue he takes with the main judgment is that “an entitlement to 
commercial trade under a state licence does not fit comfortably within the constitutional 
notions of property”.251 His reasoning is that a license was simply permission to carry out an 
action which would be unlawful in the absence of a licence.252 He assessed the characteristics 
of a license, namely that they are:  
 subject to administrative withdrawal and change; 
 never absolute, often conditional and frequently time-bound;  
 never there for the taking, but instead are subject to specified pre-conditions; and 
 are also not freely transferable.253 
 
He further concluded that a liquor licence does not vest in its holder since it is granted by 
the state and is legitimately open to state regulation from time to time.254 In light of the above, 
the license does not fit the notions of Constitutional property.  
 
In rejecting the values based approach in favour of assessing the characteristics of the object, 
right or interest, Moseneke DCJ noted further that “[t]he objective evaluation of whether a 
liquor licence is property cannot be premised on a speculative claim to other fundamental 
rights of an individual’s human dignity, occupation and freedom, particularly on the part of a 
substantial corporate trader” 255 (my emphasis added). He continued later to state that “[t]he 
inherent limitation in the core attribute of a liquor licence cannot be played down and 
supplanted by other rights in the Constitution in order to justify a finding of property which 
otherwise does not fit the objective enquiry.”256 Moseneke DCJ assessed the attributes of the 
right in question and used this as the basis to conclude whether it should be held to be 
property or not.  
 
The third judgment, written by Madlanga J, was a minority decision that also adopted an 
attributes approach to determining whether an object, right or interest is property. Madlanga J 
                                                          
251 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraph 122. 
252 Ibid at paragraph 122. 
253 Ibid at paragraph 122. 
254 Ibid at paragraph 123. 
255 Ibid at paragraph 127. 
256 Ibid at paragraph 127. 
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did not, however, agree with the reasoning of the Moseneke DCJ that led to his conclusion 
that the grocer’s license was not property.  
 
Madlanga J raised a concern that Froneman J saw the need to use other rights in the Bill of 
Rights to water down “the potency of the right to property to the point where it does little 
more than ride on the coat-tails of rights such as human dignity”.257 
 
In determining whether a grocer’s wine license was property, he compared it to the 
enrichment claim held to be property in the Opperman258 case and he concluded that “[w]hile 
an enrichment claim was enforceable against only one party and was extinguishable if 
successfully defended, it was readily held to be logical and realistic to accept this is property 
as property whilst it was arguably more removed from acceptable property rights than a 
grocers wine license”.259  
 
In assessing the attributes of the wine license for himself, Madlanga J concluded that it:  
 is an entitlement to conduct business under certain circumstances; 
 may endure indefinitely;  
 is protected by procedures which must be carried out before its cancellation  
 has enabled Shoprite Checkers to trade; 
 has objective commercial value; 
 is transferrable, possibly even as consideration for another valuable asset/right; and 
 has given value to the business of Shoprite as an entity.260 
 
It was found that the “grocer’s wine licence, which has all the hallmarks of property, 
should be adjudged not to be property purely because it is a licence”.261 Madlanga J also 
noted that some types of licences “may lack factors that lead to a characterisation that they 
are property” which is why he did not consider that the finding that this particular license was 
                                                          
257 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC at paragraph 139. 
258 National Credit Regulator v Opperman and others 2013 (2) SA 1 (CC). 
259 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraph 142. 
260 My adaptation of the attributes listed in 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraph 143. 
261 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
Environmental Affairs and Tourism, Eastern Cape and Others 2015 (6) SA 125 (CC) at paragraph 150. 
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property could be problematic for legislative purposes.262 
 
The first complication with this attributes-based approach that is noteworthy is that there is 
no closed list of attributes which were listed or discussed in this case to use in the 
consideration of whether other licenses or rights will be held to be property for the purposes 
of section 25 of the Constitution.  
 
Second, it could also be seen to be a problem that the justices were relying upon attributes 
that are used in the common law to determine whether an object/right is property while the 
Constitution is in fact the supreme law of the Republic and it should be used to interpret the 




Arguably, it is possible for an attributes based approach to be adopted as the correct method 
to be used in determining whether an object, right or interest is property given that both 
Moseneke DCJ and Madlanga J used this approach. Insofar as the approach to be used to 
determine whether the right is property or not is concerned, they form a majority (six out of 
11 Justices) by both assessing characteristics – however their conclusions as well as their 
approaches differed as to which attributes to consider.  
 
 
Accordingly, there is no certainty as to what methodology or criteria should be applied to 
determine what the test is for property. There are only confirmed forms which either relate to 
specific examples that have been accepted as property or relate to forms of property that 
presently exist in terms of the common law.  
 
5.8 Alternative definitions and policy recommendations 
 
Given the controversy which surrounds the definition of property and the uncertain direction 
of the developing constitutional jurisprudence, it is recommended that a definition which is 
                                                          
262 Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Limited v Member of the Executive Council for Economic Development, 
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readily understandable and forms a closed list of what may be the object of an expropriation 
should be adopted.  
 
A possible definition, which is essentially the first portion of the definition put forward by the 
DA, could be:  
 
“Property for the purposes of this Act shall be limited to; any land; any interest in land; (and) 
immovable real rights in land including the right of a lessee of the land”.263 
 
I do not think it is necessary for the balance of the definition proposed by the DA since the 
above forms a closed list of what may be expropriated. The reasons for preferring the above 
closed list are as follows:  
 
(a) Much of the media attention relating to the expropriation Bill has centred on its purpose 
for land reform. It would follow that the definition of property should match the expectations 
which the citizenry have formed in light of this and the public consultations.  
 
(b) The state may promulgate other legislation should it wish to forcibly acquire other forms 
of property. These other laws of general application can be debated and genuine public 
consultation on those issues by the interested stakeholders may take place. If one considers 
the expropriation of intellectual property, as an example, which has not been subject to much 
public debate because of the time taken up by the issue of how expropriation may shape land 
reform. Do many holders of intellectual property rights even know about the potential powers 
this Bill grants the state to interfere with their rights to their intellectual property? It is simply 
not necessary for the State to create a one-size, one-act, fits all-forms-of-property regime in 
order to enable the provisions of the Constitution.  
 
(c) The closed definition of property above resolves any uncertainty which the ordinary 
citizen and foreign investors will experience when attempting to understand what may be 
expropriated. This certainty will enable a positive economic growth environment which is a 
                                                          
263 BAD Martins “Report of the Portfolio Committee on Public Works on the Expropriation Bill [B 4 – 2015]” 
published in Parliament of Republic of South Africa, Announcements, Tablings And Committee Reports No 
5─2016 8 February 2016 available at 
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necessary component to resolving our pressing social issues. This revised definition will 




This dissertation was aimed at examining the scope of what constitutes property for the 
purposes of the Expropriation Bill 2015. The case law, the writings of authors regarding the 
common law, the Constitutional Jurisprudence, the existing and the proposed expropriation 
statutes have all been examined in an attempt to pen a succinct understanding of what may 
constitute property.  
 
While conclusions have been reached about definitive examples or categories that are 
accepted to be property, this topic will remain open to debate and development as long as the 
definition of property as contained in the Bill remains unedited. It is noteworthy that the 
definition of property, as contained in the 2015 Bill, is wider than its predecessor and faces an 
uncertain/evolving definition due to developing jurisprudence. Interested stakeholders have 
already noted that, should the Bill be passed in its present form, it will be challenged in the 
courts.  
 
If the Expropriation Bill is truly aimed at land restitution, then the definition of property 
should not remain as merely a signpost to section 25 of the Constitution, but should rather be 
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